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FORMS OF ANGLO-SAXON CONTRACTS AND 
THEIR SANCTIONS: 
II. THE WARRANTY CONTRACTS. 
Jncl11ding (a) Warranty of Title, and (b) Warranty of Quality . . 
Perhaps the most primitive commercial transaction affecting legal 
rights was the executed barter; in a more advanced state when 
money had been introduced, the executed sale. 
In the very earliest Anglo-Saxon period of which we have knowl-
edge such transactions might involve contractu~l rights. For ·in-
stance we read in the laws of King AETHELBERT,53 "If a man buy a 
maiden· with cattle, let the. bargain stand, if it be without guile; but 
if there be guile, let him bring.her home again, and let .his property 
be restored to him." The •bargain,. if there ·ha!? been gu_ile, has not 
been ·executed ·properly. There is then a right of rescission. The 
laws clearly.state a lega:l right of t~e party defrauded to hi,ive his 
original property restored to him. . . . 
What was 'the nature of st~ch ·right,, and how· was "it enforced? 
From our modern point of view it is· contractual. The prop~rty in 
the maiden and in the cattle had passed. An obligation, at the option 
of the defrauded party, rested ·on both parties to revest the pr-0perty 
exchanged. · But it may at once occur to the n~ader -th:;i.t primitive 
men did not fook upon the matter from our _modern viewpoint. Per-
haps the defrauded party conceived of his claim for restitution a~. 
"real." He demanded the return of his own. As a matter of fact 
such was not the case, if we may judge from AngJo-Saxon proce-
dure. There were only two kinds of proceedings which could be 
brought for a chattel. One .was the property procedure involving 
a charge .of theft. The other was Debt. . In the case in question the 
first cleai:ly could not be brought, for the chattels had been parted 
with with consent. If the second were brought it would have to be 
based on a contract.5.r So if either party could sue it must have been 
on a contract right. If we take as an example a case of failure of 
title the matter is still clearer. A buys a cow from B; it turns out 
that B hatf no title. B is under obligation to give A another cow of 
the same value.54" Certainly if A sues B it is not upon a "real" 
right. 
But it seems proba•ble that in the early law no direct action was 
available for B where there was a failure of title. And where there 
· .. Continued from the May issue. Copyright r9r7 by Robert L. Henry, Jr • 
.. Aethelbert, 71. 
u Laughlin, r96. 
Gta Cf. Glanvil, III, c. 1. 
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was a breach of warranty of quality there was a provision for a spe-
cial issue on the point. How do such procedural facts then affect 
the question as to the nature of right? In case of failure of title 
it would seem that judicial recognition was.at first indirect. The 
law started with the composition procedure above described.55 By 
it the first legal needs of society were met, namely redress for 
assault, battery, and homicide. It was not long, however, before 
trouble caused by stealing, particularly cattle-stealing, gave serious 
concern, and we get the theft-procedure. The composition proce-
dure, as we have seen, was set in motion by demanding justice, 
backed up by threats of vengeance. Thereby the defendant was 
induced to enter into the procedural contract, with sureties. The 
theft-pi;ocedure was begun by demanding property as ones own. 
The defendant would then have to give it up, or give sureties to 
insure his proving that it was his own. 
A sues B for the recovery of a stolen cow. One plea that B may 
set up in defense is that he bought the cow from a designated party, 
C. If B can produce C, <\nd C admits the sale, B may give the cow 
into C's hands and the suit will then proceed against the latter, thus 
freeing B from the charge.56 Suppose then C succeeds in defending 
the charge of theft, but is una:ble to prove ownership or to produce 
his own wa:rrantor. In that case C will have to give up the cow to A. 
The procedure in this matter we find early, in the laws of 
HLOTHAER and EADRIC 7, "If any man steal property from another., 
and the owner afterwards lay claim to it; let him vouch to warranty 
at the king's hall, if he can, and let him bring thither the person who 
sold it to him; if he cannot do that, let him give it up and let the 
owner take possession of it." 
In our case B has paid C for the cow, what then are B's rights~ 
Obviously C should give him another cow. It is clear B had such a 
right.56a But what of an action to enforce it? The purpose of a 
suit was to determine a right, not to enforce it, ~nd judgments had 
in any case to be collected by the plaintiffs, and not by officers of 
the law. What clearer determination, then, of B's rights could be 
desired than in the action of theft between A and C? If C cannot 
defend his title and gives up the cow to A, he must, of course, 
compensate B. 
But what will compel C to compensate B? The very same sure-
ties who held c to his obligation of warranty, who compel him to 
take B's place in the theft charge brought by A. For certainly the 
""Ante, page 554·5· 
"' Oaths 3, Ethelred II., 9 • 
... Cf. Glanvil, III, c. r. 
ANGLO-SAXON CONTRACTS 
claiming of the chattel in B's hands will itself be no constraint upon 
C. To get him to court there must be a different set of sureties 
from those given to release A's demand for the thing claimed to 
be stolen. 
There might, however, be a preliminary issue which would have 
to be settled. C might deny the sale of the particular cow and re-
fuse to accept it back. Provision for such an issue is found in !NE 
75; ''If a man attach stolen property, and the person with whom it 
is attached then vouch another man to warranty; if then the man 
will not accept it, and says that he never sold him that, "but sold him 
other; then must he prove who vouches it to that person, that he 
sold to him none other, but that same." 
A further issue may be suggested, for may not C deny having sold 
B any cow? In the first Anglo-Saxon period such an issue could 
not have occurred. For as has been shown,57 you could not get a 
defendant before the court on a contract claim unless you had taken 
sureties at the time of the making of the contract. So if the defend-
ant was in court, brought there by his sureties, there could ·be no 
question of the defendant having sold the plaintiff something, for 
otherwise the sureties would not have required him to 'answer, in 
fact there would have been no sureties. At a later time, when 
sureties were provided to hold a man to every justice, it might hap-
pen that a defendant would deny having sold anything to the plain-
tiff and that there would consequently be such an issue.58 
. In the guile case a need was early felt for the direct determination 
of an issue raised ·by a breach of warranty of quality, as the matter 
could not be incidentally settled as in the failure of title case. 
Vv e read in !NE 56, "if a man buy any kind of cattle and he then 
discover any unsoundness in it within XXX days; then let him 
throw the cattle on his vendor's hands, or let the latter swear that 
he knew not of any"unsoundness in it when he sold it to him." 
The oaths used in the suit wel:"e as follows: 
Plaintiff's oath: "In the name of Almighty God, thou didst en-
gage to me sound and clear that which thou soldest to me, and full 
security against after-claim, on the witness of N., who then was 
with us two."59 
Defendant's oath: "In the name of Almighty God, I knew not, in 
the ~hings about which thou suest, foulness or fraud, or infirmity or 
01 See supra, page 562. 
a Cf. Glanvil, X, c. 15, "But if he have made default in his warranty, then there 
will be a plea between the purchaser and his warrantor, so that matlers may arrive 
at a duel" 
11 Oaths X. 
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blemish, up to that day's-tide that I sold it to thee; but it was both 
sound and clean, without any kind of fraud."60 
The plaintiff's claim is based on the defendant's engagement. The 
denial first asserts good faith, the absence of knowledge on the de-
fendant's part, and then ends with a flat denial of unsoundness. The 
action looks like one for fraud, but it only covers such frauds as 
arise out of contracts of sale. :fhe wrong is a breach of contract. 
\Vhat were the formalities of the contract violated by failure to 
give good title, and by the giving of unsound goods with an engage-
ment of soundness? And what were their sanctions? How were 
defendants brought to court? 
We may suppose that ·barters or sales took place at first without 
any formalities except such as were inherent in the nature of the· 
transaction. Each party formally delivered goods to the other. 
But at a very early date witnesses became an essential part of the 
ceremony. Were they necessary in order that title might pass? 
Probably. The laws prescribed them. In HLOTHAER and EADRIC 
16, we read, "If any Kentish-man buy a chattel in Lunden-wic, let 
him then have two or three true men to witness, or the king's wic-
reeve." And all through the Anglo-Saxon laws are to be found 
similar provisions.61 Also a fine was prescribed for dealings with-
out witnesses.62 And when a man bought cattle when out on a jour-
ney there were minute provisions for declaring the matter to his 
neighbors upon his return, and heavy penalties, forfeiture of life 
and property, for failure to do so.63 
The primary object of the witnesses was as a safeguard against 
theft. The purchaser needed them in order to defend against a 
charge of theft. 
In the second place, they were of use in proving that a defendant 
was vendor and warrantor of title, in case an issue was taken on 
that point. They thus en~bled a purchaser to compel his vendor to 
defend in his place; and were also witnesses of the vendor's obliga-
tion to compensate his vendee in case the chattel had to be given up 
on the claim of a third party. 
The matter of witnesses then, at least in all important sales,-
there were exceptions in matters of trifling values64,-was so rigidly 
prescribed and of such practical importance, that we may fairly con-
clude that a sale or delivery without witnesses was imperfect and 
.. Oaths XI. 
01 Aethclstan, I, IO, I2; Edgar, Supp. 6. 
o2 Aethelstan, I, Io. · 
03 Edgar Supp. 7-n. 
"'See Aethelstan, I, I2-where witnesses are required for sales ol property over 
XX pence in value. 
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did not give the vendee the full property. A matter, which for cen-
turies was required by law and custom, must in the popular mind 
have become an essential of validity. 
Also, in the later law at any rate, sureties were required in exe-
cuted sales. In ETHELRED I, 3, we read: "And let no man either 
buy or exchange, unless he have sureties and witnesses; but if any 
one do so, let the land-lord take possession of and hold the property, 
till that it be known who rightfully owns it." When such a' stage 
has ·been reached, and in practice we may take it the expedient of 
requiring sureties of a vendor must have very early been resorted to, 
the form of the executed contract of sale becomes precisely that of 
the formal surety contract. The ceremony of the wed with the giv-
ing of sureties is gone through with with witnesses. The two con-
tracts are completely assimilated. And such is quite what we 
should expect. The surety contract was regularly employed for 
matters which were purposely left executory on one side. \i\ihy 
should it not be used for transactions which were intended to be 
fully executed, but which might turn out not to have been so? 
It is submitted that we have here an additional proof that the 
obligations of vendors tci make good for failure of title or for un-
soundness were strictly contractual. We need not rely on the pro-
cedure for the enforcement of such rights alone. The form of the 
transaction clinches the point. · 
But why have sureties? For exactly the same reason as in the 
unilateral, or partly executed, contract. How was one to get his 
warrantor to court, if he was unwilling to come voluntarily? 
Obviously, .by the procedural contract made in advance, with sure-
.ties. The ability of a vendee to force his vendor to ·submit to the 
jurisdiction of a court was of the most vital importance. If he could 
get him there he could force him to take the chattel claimed as 
stolen, and defend in the vendee's place. In case· the vendor was 
forced to give up the chattel to 'the claimant in the theft suit, the 
same sureties were "at hand to compel him to give another of equal 
value to his vendee. 
So although the earliest laws mention only witnesses and not sure-
ties, the latter were of such importance that we may conclude they 
were early employed. Unless they were, we can hardly say that 
there were warranty contracts in connection with the sale. It 
might happen that a vendor who had not given sureties would be 
willing to defend in his vendee's place, but the chances were against 
it, for by doing so he would run the risk of ·being convicted of theft 
himself, and it was most likely that it was for the express purpose 
of avoiding such an obligation that he omitted to give sureties. 
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If he voluntarily came forward, and lost the chattel to the claim-
ant, it might be that the judgment against him would require him 
to give sureties, as security for compensating the vendee. If so, his 
contractual obligation would begin with the giving of such sureties. 
But it may well be doubted whether a court would compel the giving 
of sureties, or render any judgment to compensate the purchaser 
against the seller, if the latter had not assumed such obligation in 
the first instance by a formal surety contract. 
Were these warranty contracts express or implied, and was there 
any difference in that respect between the warranty of title and the 
warranty of quality? 
In the first place, the caution should be made that it was the form 
in both .cases which gave validity and not words, express or implied: 
vVe must put aside any preconceptions that we may have from our 
familiarity with consensual contracts, for it was centuries later be-
fore they were recognized in England. To talk about suing on con-
tracts express, implied in fact, or implied in law, would be an 
anachronism. The question is simply: did every vendor who could 
be sued have to expressly guarantee his title, and the soundness of 
the goods he sold, or were such warranties a part of every sale re-
gardless of whether the vendor said anything or not? 
It is submitted, that when the procedural contract was entered 
into, i. e. when there were not only witnesses, but also sureties, that 
the vendor did say something. Or at any rate, that in every sale in 
which sureties were given there was a warranty. If the vendor was 
unwilling to warrant he could refuse to give sureties on that express 
understanding. There would of course be witnesses, for they were 
necessary to protect the vendee from the charge of theft. But if 
the vendor had no intention to defend in his vendee's place, and to 
compensate him if the· chattel were lost through a third party's 
claim, he could quit-claim by refusing to give sureties. As to the 
warranty of quality, it would seem likely that express words were 
used, for the oath used for the declaration ran: "In the name of 
Almighty God, thou dids't engage to me sound and clean that which 
thou soldest to me, and full security against after-claim, on the wit-
ness of N. who then was with us two.''65 The action is on the prom-
ise and apparently on an express engagement to make good in case 
there was unsoundness. · 
What was testified to by the transaction witness was what he saw 
and heard,66 so if t~e suit was for breach of warranty, we may take 
es Oaths 7 • 
.. Oaths 8. 
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it that he testified to words of warranty, or at least to what the 
agreement was, as evidenced by what the parties said. 
It may be said then, that in every case in which a right for breach 
of warranty existed, there had ·been a surety contract entered into 
at the time of the sale, and suit, if brought, was upon such contract. 
In all cases where he gave sureties, the vendor probably actually 
warranted, usually expressly. In failure of title cases, it might not 
have been of great importance what he said, for the very fact that 
he sold and gave sureties showed that he warranted the title. In 
warranty of quality cases, the words, no doubt, were of greater 
significance, were perhaps essential for the right. 
It is felt to be justifiable to place the warranty contracts in the 
first period of Anglo-Saxon law, even though it is not clear that 
sureties were required by law in executed sales until the reign of 
King EDGAR, for the rights created by breach are very early men-
tioned. In the case quoted from the laws of AETHELBERT67 in which 
a man who bought a maiden with cattle and found that there was 
guile, was declared to have a right to have his property restored to 
him, it seems certain that the forms of the surety contract were used. 
The wed ceremony was, as far back as we have any record, a part of 
the betrothal ceremony. It is from wed that our word ·'wedding·• 
is derived. So both the purchaser of the maiden and the relatives 
who sold her must have given sureties.68 And it seems not unfair 
to conclude that such was the common practice at that early day in 
all important sales. 
III. THE CONTRACT OF COURT RECORD. 
Then there was the contract by court record. The first reference 
to it seems to be in the laws of King INE.69 It is entirely natural 
to expect to find this the first type of contract with the state ·behind 
it. Just as the criminal jurisdiction of the crown grew from a king's 
peace which first included only acts committed in the king's presence 
or in his household, and gradually extended over other places, e. g., 
to the king's highways and rivers, over specially designated times, 
and special persons, until finally the king's protection covered the 
whole realm; so the protection of contracts ·by the state began with 
those entered into in the presence of the king or his magistrates, 
or in the courts. 
The formalities of the surety contract were observed. In !NJ~ 1370 
01 Aethelbert, 77. 
"' Cf. the ceremony given fully in the Laws of Edmund • 
., Ine 13. 
,. Liebermann, VoL I. p. 95. 
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we read : "If anyone is untrue to his oath given before the bishop 
or breaks the promise entered into in his presence by the wed cere-
mony let him pay 120 shillings." 
The object of making the contract in the bishop's presence was 
to give it greater sanction than it would otherwise have had. By 
making it in the presence of an ecclesiastic the religious sanction was 
emphasized. But there was no separate ecclesiastical jurisdiction at 
this time. Bishops presided over lay courts.71 ·So the contract 
referred to, in addition to any religious weight which may have 
been conferred upon it by the particular magistrate in question, had 
behind it the power of the state. 
Again in AL~'RED 312 we read: "If anyone breaks a suretyship 
guaranteed by the king, let him pay whatever is right to the com-
plainant, and 5 pounds in silver to the king. If he break a surety-
ship secured by an archbishop, or his protection, let him pay a fine 
of 3 pounds. The breaking of the guarantee or protection of any 
other bishop or of an ealdorman shall be paid for by a fine of 2 
pounds." 
We have the same phenomenon here as in the passage from the 
laws of INE. If a. surety contract is made in the presence of the 
king or other magistrate, and is broken, a heavy fine must be paid. 
In the case of the magistrates other than the king the same fine is 
prescribed for a breach of protection. A lordless man or one with-
out relatives to become his sureties might flee to a magistrate. The 
latter might then take him under protection and become surety for 
him. If the pursued then defaulted, he was subject to the above 
prescribed fines. 
In the passages ci~ed it is not clear whether sureties were re-
quired or not, whether it would be sufficient to give a substantial wed 
as a pledge, or perhaps whether the ceremony alone, with a symbolic 
wed, would do. It is submitted that all three possibilities were used 
on occasion. The natural thing in the usual case would ·be to re-
quire sureties. In some instances there could be no objection to 
receiving a substantial pledge instead. In such a case the magis-
trate would naturally keep the pledge himself. Even without either 
sureties or pledge, the making of the contract in the magistrate's 
presence would be sanctioned by the threatened fine. Sometimes 
the magistrate would be willing, not only when the debtor was a 
friend or person of standing, but also when he was a poor man who 
had fled to him for protection, to become surety for him. In such 
n Pollock & Maitland's Hist. Eng. Law. I. 16. 
"Liebermann, 51. 
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a case if protection was granted the magistrate himself would have 
to see to it that the debtor did his part. 
In the last situation it might be asked, was the magistrate per-
sonally liable? Certainly not if he was the king; but a lesser magis-
trate probably was. Note the difference between the two in the 
passage cited from King ALFRED. As to magistrates other than the 
king there is a provision both for the ·breach of a guaranty of surety-
ship, and for nmnd-bryce or breach of protection. In the former 
case the magistrate exacted sureties, or a substantial pledge. In 
such a case he was not personally liable. In the latter case he took 
the defendant under his protection, in other words, he became surety 
for him, in just the same way every lord was under obligation to 
become surety for his dependents.73 
The contract so made before a judicial magistrate was essentially 
a contract of court record. It was the fact that it was made in court 
which distinguished it from other contracts. In an important re-
spect it differed from later contracts of record; that is, the sanction 
was indirect. It was a fine exacted by the state for its breach. 
B.-890 A. D. To 1027 A. D. 
IV. THE CONTRACT OF PLIGHTED FAITH. 
In the laws of King ALFRED we get the first mention of a con-
tract which did not depend on sureties for its force. The surety 
employed was Deity. 
"If any one complains of another that l].e has broken a promise 
made with God as a surety, and says that the party complained of. 
has not fulfilled his promise, let him take an oath to that effect in 
four churches; and if the defendant wishes to clear himself let him 
take an oath in twelve churches."74 
Although the quotation is from the lay and not from the ecclesias-
tical part of ALFRED'S dooms, the matter appears to be one of 
Church jurisdiction rather than one for the lay courts. The pro-
cedure is much like that employed in the lay courts, and perhaps 
indicates a church jurisdiction over contracts which continued in 
operation until put an end to by the Constitutions of Clarendon in 
A. D., 1164. 
However that may be, there was without doubt a common practice 
of attempting to give promises sanction by the performance of the 
wed ceremony, without the giving of human sureties. For example, 
73 As in Ethelred l, r. 
n Alfred 33, Liebermann, Vol. I, 67. 
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we see the great men of the Witan giving their weds to the Arch·· 
bishop to make binding their promises to do justice and to see that 
the laws are executed.75 The members of town and· gild organiza-
tions gave each other their weds to confirm their solemn promises 
to abide by the peace of and the rules of group or organization.70 
If there were no ecclesiastical penalties suffered for breach of 
su~h obligations, we may conclude there were none, other than those 
of social pressure and public opinion. For there is nothing to indi-
cate that ·the state ever gave any aid, other than perhaps some ap-
proval or support, to the ecclesiastical tribunals. It seems reasonably 
certain that such contracts wer~ not actionable in the lay courts.71 
V. TH-E PLEDGE CONTRACT. 
Predsely when the pledge contract arose may be difficult to say, 
but how and why it arose may be explained. It is placed in the 
second period for the reason that there is nothing to show it was 
used in the first. Like the surety contract, it could be used for 
procedural purposes, and was perhaps first used in that way.78 !t 
seems to have been a modified form of the surety c_ontract. _It might 
sometimes happen that the defendant could find no one willing to 
become surety for him. In that case if he had property he could 
induce someone to be his surety by placing the sum claimed, or a 
sufficient amount of property in the surety's hands. The wed then 
instead of •being a worthless symbol, became a substantial pledge. 
\i\Then the same contract was· used to secure extra-judicial agree-· 
ments there was no particular use for -the surety. A defendant 
might be quite unwilling _to place his money or property into the 
plaintiff's hands, but it was quite another matter, when, for instance, 
he wa.s about to borrow money. There would then be no objection 
to the lender holding the pledge himself instead of passing it on to 
a third person. · . . 
There can be no doubt that the early pledge was a wed. Wed 
is the word for a pledge. And as we find the pledge in the hands of 
the pledgee instead of in those of a surety, it must be that its passing 
to the surety has been arrested. 
Witnesses for such a transaction would seem to be unessential. 
They were of no use for making proof in a suit, for as will be 
shown, no right of action grew out of the matter. Possibly the 
pledgee might demand them in order to defend in case he were 
n-Aethelstan, V. Judicia Civitatis Lundoniae, Tenth. 
tt Acthelstan, V. Judicia Civitatis Lundoniae, Intro. 
11 See an interesting discussion of this contract, there called fides facta, in Pollock 
& Maitland's History of English Law, II, pp. 181-187. 
""Ethelred III, 12. 
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charged with theft. Or they might 1be required in order that a 
formal transfer of the property in the pledge might be made to the 
pledgee. But no doubt motives of secrecy would often induce the 
making of the transaction in private and without witnesses. 
The result of leaving otit the sureties would be to destroy the 
actionability of the transaction. There would be no sureties to 
compel appearance. But might not the pledge itself be a sufficient 
constraint ?79 Yes, if the creditor could sqe the debtor on the debt. 
But he could not. EP In the absence _of such a right there would 
seem to b.e little chance of an issue being brought b_efore the courts 
at the instance of the creditor. -
At a later time, when equitable rights in the res had developed, 
the situation was of course different. The creditor did in certain 
cases have an interest in the thing which might induce him to sue 
if there were an appropriate remedy. If the debtor defaulted, the 
creditor would wish to make the thing his own. If it had been 
transferred to him informally, that is, without a properly witnessed 
1 ivery of seisin1-for that was as necessary for chattels as for land 
iin the early law,81-it still belonged to the debtor: The creditor 
then would wish to foreclose· the debtor's rights, and acquire the 
.authority of the court to dispose of the chattel as· his own. In 
GLANVIL's time he was given such a r-ight.lllZ Likewise the debtor 
was given an equitable right to redeem.83 Involved in the remedies 
also was the matter of the duty of care for the chattel. But in the 
Anglo-Saxon regime we need not look for such rights. We must 
find a single issue action, or conclude that there was no legal re-
.dress. And as has been stated the pledgee had no such right. It 
certainly would not have •been fair to allow him to recover the debt· 
and not to compel him at the same time to return the pledge. But 
that would involve more than a single issue, and a rather complex 
"one at that, for there would be the question of due care to consider. 
lt might be answered as to that, that "an absolute liability could be 
imposed on the pledgee and perhaps was. But even so, there would 
·be a double issue, for while the pledgee sued for the debt the pledgor ' 
would ·be suing for the pledge, a situation which the Anglo-Saxon 
procedure was not able to contemplate. No contract except a 
unilateral one was actiona'ble. 
n Cf. Quaere to that effect by G!anvil, X, c. 8. 
81 That was the rule in primitive Germanic law generally. Wigmore, 10 Harv. L. 
Rev. 327. Also such was the rule of the Common Law of Glanvil's age, ·Glanvil, 
x. c. 8. 
m Pollock & Maitland's Hist. F;ng. Law, II, p. 179. 
a Glanvil, Book X, c. 8. 
83 Glanvil, Book X, c. 9. 
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If we turq to the plight of the pledgor we find precisely the same 
situation, for he could not sue to get back his pledge. First, let us 
note that in the case supposed •the pledgee had given no sureties to 
compel him to return the pledge. How get. him to court? If the 
pledge was more valuable than the money, there would be no con-
straint in the transaCtion itself, as there might be if the pledgee 
wished to sue. 
Again, what remedy was available to the pledgor? There were 
only two possible actions. One was a property claim normally in-
volving a charge of theft. Tqat certainly cpuld not be brought. 
against a. pledgee,, for he l).ad .not. taken the _property without the 
own~r's consent. . The other reme.dy was Debt; ,:which W!!S based on 
a cont111ct in genere, as LAUGHLIN calls· it,~4 even where the claini 
was for the return pf a chattel. In our_principal c;ase the ·pledgee 
~as entered.into no su.ch conJract, either a~ surety or as debtor. . 
Furt.hennore, it would not qe fair to allow· the ,pledgor to get 
the ies 'without _p~ying. th~ debt, am;l ~~t ~s statea 'above \'{ould in.:-
volv:e :n;iore that\ one issue," . . , . . · "_' · : ·, . " · · ·. 
We may conGlu4e, therefore, that the pledger could no more sue 
the pledgee, than the pledgee c~i.ild. sue the piedgor. 8~ And t~is. re-
gardless. of ~vh~ther the px:operty in the thing reqtained iri the 'pledgof 
or not. For if the propetfy had· pas~ed to tfie pleqgee without a 
formal contract foi: its retu~; ~ fortiori ther~· \V1l~ n:o remedy.· , . 
When \ve come to GLANVIr.'"S age, it makes' 'a difference whether 
the delivery of the chattel \vas formal, so as· to convey the full 
seisin or property to the piedgee, or i:i.ot, For instance, the ques-
tion. of abso11;lte lia:bility or only due .care on th~ part. of the pledge~, 
or the necessity; for forec~osure, may depend upon it. But it would 
seem that in the age under consideration, the chief difference would 
arise in case the pledgor attempted to take ·back the chattel or suc-
ceeded .in doing so.· If the chattel were still. his 'own he would not 
be guilty of larceny. · · 
As -to thir4 parties also there might. be a difference. If the 
pledgor had parted with the title, it is clear he would have no rigl}t 
to bring theft against a taker.850 That right would ·belong sokly 
to the pledgee. But if the pledgee merely had tpe custody, the right 
of protection would remain in the pledgor.86 Als·o ifl:he pledgee had 
st Laughlin, 196. 
ss Cf. Wigmore, The Pledge Idea, IO Harv. L. Rev., 327. 
ssa But see a different rule in Glanvil, X, c. II. For the older rule see Laughlin, 197· 
.. It should perhaps be noted that bailees ordinarily did have the property. Pollock 
& Maitland's Hist. Eng. Law, II, 175. It is suggested that wl:ienever th,ey were con· 
tract-bound they had the property. But the pledgee in the, case supposed was not 
bound by contract and was not suable. 
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seisin he could give an indefeasible title to a third party, which 
would not be the case if he had custody only. 
Jf neither party could sue on a pledge contract should we· not 
hesitate to call it a contract at all? The matter was executory on 
both sides, yet even without external sanction there were good 
chances of mutual performance. The debtor was constrained to 
pay by his desire to get back the article pledged, which normally 
was of greater value than the debt. Unless the disparity in value 
was great, the creditor was not strongly tempted to keep the pledge. 
He might even prefer his money. Especially would that be the 
case where the article pledged had not been formally transferred 
with witnesses. Then the pledgee, not being the absolute owner, 
would not desire to continue to hold a thing which was not his own. 
If the property in the pledge was transferred to the pledgee, if 
it was much more valuable than the debt, and if the pledgee was 
unscrupulous, he might refuse to allow redemption. But if a pledgor 
got himself into such a situation, it was his own fault. 
The pledge contract, regardless of the sanction of a right of 
action for its breach, was a usable and practical ·business transaction. 
And have we not a right to call it a contract? Other contracts, 
ninety-nine times out of a hundred, would give rise to no right of 
action, because they would be performed. Perhaps in many of the 
ninety-nine cases, performance would be due to the knowledge that 
a breach would give such a right. Out of a hundred pledge cases, 
ninety-nine would he performed because of its inherent sanctions. 
What matter if in the hundredth case there was no right of action? 
But a pledge transaction could no doubt he made actionable, if 
there were two separate surety contracts entered into, one on each 
side. When the· money is delivered to the borrower, he may give 
sureties for its repayment. Likewise, when the pledge is trans-
•ferred to the lender, he may he put under sureties for its return. 
The property in the res would then pass to the pledgee, and his 
liability, being contractual, would be as absolute as that of the 
pledgor to pay the money. Just as no amount of hard luck would 
e.v;:cuse the payment on the one side, so a similar misfortune should 
not excuse on the other. The two contracts were independent. It 
is unlikely that performancy on the debtor's part would be con-
sidered a condition P.recedent to the obligation of the creditor, as 
that would involve a double issue, which could not be settled by 
the one-sided proof of Anglo-Saxon debt procedure. The science 
of pleading for reducing a controversy to a single issue was still 
inchoate. And the rules for awarding proof now to the defendant 
and now to the plaintiff according to the result of the pleadings 
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seem to have been confined to real property actions.87 In Debt the 
plaintiff asserted that the defendant owed him, and if the latter 
defended, it was by a denial. If the pledgee sued the pledgor, the 
latter would have to take an oath that he did not owe the money, 
without raising the issue of whether the chattel had been returned 
or not. Likewise, if the pledgor sued for the chattel, the pledgee 
could not defend on the ground of non-payment of the debt. 
VI. THE DELIVERY-PROMISE. 
What may be called an informal formal contract arose at some 
time during the Anglo-Saxon period. It was like the formal surety 
contract except that the wed ceremony did not have to be performed 
at the ·time of the making of the contract. If A delivered goods on 
credit, or· money by way of loan to B, in a formal way before .wit-
·nesses, and B at the time promised· to pay A, for the goods or to 
return the loan; then if B broke his promise the matter. gave ris~ 
to an action. . .. 
:This ~ontract might be called "real," but such a name would give 
a'n entirely. wrong impression. If. would ii:pport . Roman ideas into 
-Germanic law, which should not ·be· done. - The,right of A in. such 
·-a: :Contract -was no more "real'' than in any other contract. · 'L'his js 
· cle'arly -indicated by the only ·available .action whi!:;h aould. be brought 
by the promisee. 88 Some name, however, must ibe given to. the con-
tract to di'stinguish it from the surety contract, for it was. distinct. 
'.In the surety contract the surety was the promisor, in the:.contract 
.in question it was the debtor who ·wa~ the. promisor. The latter is 
·here called.the "-delivery-promise." The delivery of property was a 
char~cteristic part of it, and also the promise. To be sure,. a:.:delivery 
· and a· pro)llise ·were a part of . the surety .. contract also; but some 
name must be chosen which will-suggest.what:i:he substance of the 
transaction -was, a'nd· "delivery-promise~' seems adequate for that 
·purpose .. -' · · · ; . 
;_ · This' contract is placed in the second period because it seems im-
probable that it could have been actionable until the changes in the 
administration of ·justice which took pface ·then,89 to-wit, the provi-
sion t~at every man should have a surety to hold him to every jus-
tice, and the. development of a determination on' the part of the 
state ind\cated by the.provisions for "riding" to compel a recalcitrant 
.p~rty to give sureties· for appearance in court. 
81 Laughlin, 230 et seq. 
88 See supra, page 553·4· 
89 See supra, page 557-8. 
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When such a point had been reached it was no longer necessary 
to have sureties, provided at its inception, for every contract. There 
were sureties already provided for all occasions in which a man's 
presence in court was demanded. 
That does not mean that men did not have to have specially desig-
nated sureties in each particular case in which they were defend-
ants. 00 The difference was that there was an officially designated 
group of sureties for every man, and group-responsibility provided 
by law, and that the state meant to compel every man of whom jus-
tice was demanded to get the required sureties from such group. It 
is not suggested that the departure was radical, for prior to such 
time there was a general customary obligation on the members of 
the kindred to go surety for each other. The difference is this: from 
that time on, the matter was no longer to ·be a matter of special 
treaty. The procedural contract was made in advance. 
This difference in the legal situation should not be expected, how-
ever, suddenly to do away with the necessity of forms. What seems 
to have taken place is this. The old ceremony was at first used. 
The debtor would hand a wed to the creditor and the creditor would 
then hand it back to the ·debtor.01 That, however, no doubt would 
after a time appear to the Saxons of that day quite as futile as it· 
does to us today. Nothing could be ga:ined by putting a man into the 
power of himself. The law had already provided with great strict-
ness that all contracts and sales should be witnessed.92 And to 
prove them it was necessary to produce at least one of the. trans-
action-witnesses, who took an oath as to what he saw and heard, 
de visu et audita.93 
The result was that a new contract, the delivery-promise, was 
evolved. It was a transaction quite as essentially formal as the 
surety contract itself. It did not derive its efficacy from the delivery 
as such, ·but from the ceremony of which the delivery was a part. 
A part of the ceremony, that of handing over the wed stick, was 
omitted, that was all. There was still the formal delivery, the formal 
promise, and the witnesses. · 
The suggestion might ~e made that the delivery-promise was 
merely ar. arrested sale or barter. For some reason the matter is 
not complete. Delivery has taken place on one 'side and not on the 
90 Even in Blackstone's day we find the "common bail," all civil suits were started 
by the arrest of the defendant, who gave John Doe and Richard Roe as bail. Bl. Comm. 
III, 1287. 
"'That such proceedings actually happened, see Pollock & Maitland's Hist. Eng. 
I.aw, II, 185 • 
., Aethelstan I, lo, 12. _ 
oz Oaths 8. 
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other. The suggestion seems plausible enough if we do not hesitate 
to apply modern notions to ancient transactions. But the danger of 
such reasoning cannot too often be warned against. At a much 
later time we find the familiar doctrine that when a bargain is 
struck for the sale of specific goods the title is at once in the pur-
chaser. Everything is complete except the delivery of the goods 
on the one hand and payment of the price on the other. To apply 
this doctrine to ancient law we must, of course, narrow down the 
case to a unilateral contract, for bilateral contracts were unknown to 
the law.94 We must assume that the money has been paid. But then 
we encounter the difficulty that in ancient law delivery was abso-
lutely essential for the transfer of property. 95 Even land had to •be 
symbolically delivered. So the undelivered goods did not. belong to 
the purchaser. Unless we reason in a circle we are starting with a 
time in which, if a man did not get the goods or the money bar-
gained for at the time -he parted with his own goods or money, 
there was no security unles& he took sureties or a pledge. 
· A partially performesJ barter or sale,' in an age of fonns, was· not 
likely of itself to give rise·to a: cause of action. The fact that a 
need· was felt for it is not sufficient lo assure us that the need was 
in et. by an; action. to fit the case .. 
. It seems quite certa~n 'that such ivci$ riqt the case.' In. the fitst 
place the mere ·fact that a vendee _had delivered,-goods and liad not 
received the price gave him no"right~ .. It was absqfotely necessary 
that deliveiy and promise be: witnessed. For· instance, ill AETHEL-
sTA~ I, ro we read, "And let no ~an ·exch~nge a.rly ,Property "without 
the "\vitness· of the 'reeve, or of the niass:.priest,. or of the landlord, 
or of the hordere, of other' unlying rrian. If anyone 'so do let hlm 
giv~ XXX shillings,_ and let the landlorq take permission of the 'ex-
change.'~ Evei;i ·an executed exchange required witnesses. The same 
\\'.aS a· fortiori the rule where the transaction W(.lS executory On one 
s_ide. The 'delivery as .such gave no rights. It was the witnessed 
cei:emony which did that.. ' . ' . . 
Furthermore, the surety contract itself was prescribed for sales 
as late as the reign .of King ETHELRED, 980;-roI.6. ETHELRED- I, 3 
reads, "And let no man either ·buy or exchange, unless he have suret:Y; 
and witness; but if any one do so let the land-lord take possession of, 
and hold the property, till it be known who rightfully owns it."0 G 
91 Such was the case also in th~ time of Glanvil; (Glanvil, Book X,) and probably 
until about 144'" 
sswmiston on Sales, 354; Pollock & Maitland's Hist. Eng. Law, II, p. 179· 
91 Cf. Alfred and Guthrum's Pesee, 5. 
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If an executed sale was not valid without formality, certainly a par-
tially executed one was not. 
That there was such a contract in use among the Anglo-Saxons 
can hardly admit of doubt, though direct evidence on the subject is 
lacking. Perhaps the strongest evidence is that in Germanic law 
generally there were the two types of contract, the old formal, and 
the "real."97 In addition to that we have the law of GLANVIL to 
appeal to. 
In GLANVIL we find two distinct writs, one to summon a debtor, 
and one to summon a surety.98 The latter was clearly to enforce 
surety contracts; the former could not very well have been so used. 
For where there was a surety, the surety only was liable, and not the 
debtor,99 and if the surety needed to get the debtor to court to 
defend, that was his business and not the creditor's. It is possible 
that the writ running against the debtor was invented to assist the 
surety in such purpose, or to enable the surety to get reimbursement 
from the debtor. But Debt i~ the king's courts was from the be-
ginning brought against debtors, where there were no sureties.100 
So we may be sure that there was a "delivery-promise" in GLANVIL's 
time. How long it was in existence before that, we cannot say. 
But taking into consideration other systems of Germanic law we 
may take it that such a contract was enforceable for some centurie" 
before GLANVIL.1 01. 
VII. THE WRI'tTEN CONTRACT. 
A debt could be proved •by a charter or document.102 The docu-
ment itself became a sufficient form in later times, but in the age 
under consideration the writing was nothing more than proof, 
taking the place of the necessity of pro{iucing witnesses.103 The 
transaction which took place when the writing was delivered was 
probably essentially the same as in the "delivery-promise." One 
party delivered goods or chattels to the other, the latter instead of 
making his promise orally before witnesses handed his promise over 
01 Laughlin, p. 189. 
os Glanvil, Book X, c. 2 and c. 4 • 
., Glanvil, Book X, c. 3. 
1"' Glanvil, Book X, c. 2. 
101 It does) not seem fair to argue from the wording of the oaths (see page -, 
supra), that there was a "delivery-promise." The oaths as pointed out clearly indicate 
an issue between creditor and debtor, but still that is to be expected even in sureiy 
contracts, for it was the debtor's business to defend. 
102 Laughlin, 188. 
102 Laughlin, 188. 
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in writing. If a donation-was to be made in writing it was customary 
for the donee to hand the donor something in exchange for the 
writing.1oi 
VIII. TH:e EARNEST CONTRACT. 
And finally, the. bi-lateral contract of bargain and sale entered 
into with "earnest" requires mention. Its genealogy is clear. The 
arrha or "earnest" is the Saxon wed.105 The same ceremony which 
W?S used to ·bind the surety was employed to ·bind the bargain. The 
"earriest" contract was clearly a popular development from the 
surety contract. But it was a late development. .In GLANv1r;'s time, 
if he gives us a correct picture 'of the customary law, it was still un-
pledged,106 ci.nd even in BRAcToN's day it was in its infancy.107 
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